With the‭ ‬end‭ ‬of the great military confrontation in Central Europe,‭ ‬world wars are unlikely to recur.‭ ‬In the heteropolar world order which is arising, tensions will be generated and sparks will fly, but major powers will find non-violent ways to resolve their differences.

They must, if the catastrophic consequences associated with the failure to accommodate power shifts in the 20th century – two world wars and the Cold War – are not to be repeated.

State failure in secondary areas, on the other hand, can be managed – so to speak – mainly through denial, an averted gaze or, not infrequently, wilful blindness.

Among the residual conflicts that remain in the age of globalization, small-scale,‭ ‬irregular wars,‭ ‬ ‬such as those being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq,‭ ‬and asymmetrical wars,‭ ‬such as the Global War on Terror,‭ ‬ have moved to centre stage. Essentially discretionary in nature, these somewhat exotic, episodic contests have pitted regular militaries against an unconventional opposition, at best with mixed results.‭

Such types of conflict are often conflated, and are becoming more common. Yet success‭ ‬-‭ ‬as expressed through greater security‭ ‬-‭ ‬has not been achieved.‭

Foreign ministries, among others, have not been pre-occupied with assessing the meaning of these sorts of shifts, or the impact on how they conduct their operations abroad.

Not so, however, with the departments of defence. In‭ ‬1989,‭ ‬a group of serving and former members of the US military,‭ ‬mainly marines,‭ ‬put forth a very focused discussion of insurgency in a paper entitled‭ ‬Fourth Generation Warfare‭ (‬4GW‭).

The authors maintain that the essence of warfare has evolved from massed manpower,‭ ‬to massed firepower,‭ ‬to manoeuvre,‭ ‬and now to a fourth stage characterized by asymmetry.‭ ‬The old linear,‭ ‬hierarchic and orderly doctrines and practices must therefore be replaced by an appreciation of the unpredictable,‭ ‬loosely networked and disorderly conditions so prevalent in battle today,‭ ‬particularly in the often remote and turbulent areas where most of contemporary conflict occurs.

The ever-evolving nature of war has been captured especially eloquently by retired British general Sir Rupert Smith in‭ ‬The Utility of Force.‭ ‬Smith maintains that the all-out struggles of the‭ ‬20th century,‭ ‬epic trials of strength which he terms‭ “‬industrial war,‭” ‬have been made obsolete by nuclear weapons,‭ ‬and been replaced by a battle of wills,‭ ‬or‭ “‬war amongst the people,‭” ‬whose outcomes must ultimately be settled by political rather than military means.‭ ‬This was the case for conflicts in Northern Ireland,‭ ‬Cyprus,‭ ‬Algeria and Vietnam. A related lesson was painfully re-learned in Iraq,  and the need to find a negotiated end to NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan will almost certainly become the received wisdom  there.

The sad experience with the initially inept, uncoordinated response of the international community to the recent earthquake in Haiti provides a different angle on this observation. Decades of military intervention by a variety of outside forces,‭ ‬followed sometimes by internationally supervised elections,‭ ‬has not proven a successful substitute for the wholesale failure of development.

In any event…Irregular warfare ‬has‭ ‬become the new normal in global conflict. Its prevalence has given rise to innovative approaches to conflict management,‭ ‬such as the‭ “‬Three Block War‭”‬,‭ and Canada’s ‬3D (defence, development, diplomacy) approach to international intervention.‭ In 2006 the US Department of Defense released a new counterinsurgency strategy and strategic studies scholars are moving to organize and codify the various new approaches.

Some see all of this amounting to a‭ “‬revolution in military affairs‭”‬,‭ ‬a theory which originated in the USA and proved very popular with the Bush administration. Adherents suggest that changes in technology and organization have transformed the ways in which wars can and should be fought.‭

This‭ “‬revolution,‭” ‬moreover,‭ ‬has not produced the results its proponents predicted.‭ ‬Instead,‭ ‬it has prompted observations that:‭

• the technologically strong cannot necessarily or always defeat the militarily weak,‭ ‬especially if the latter have the support of the local population‭

• insurgent forces can inflict‭ (‬politically‭) ‬significant casualties against a much better armed opposition‭; ‬vulnerability has become mutual‭

• when organized militaries,‭ ‬regardless of their notional capacities,  pursue irregular militants, victory can by no means be assured and blowback is likely

• tactical,‭ ‬real time intelligence plus precision munitions cannot replace boots on the ground‭

‭All of this is fine, but an even larger message  seems to have been missed.

‭If counterinsurgency is 80% political, then why ask the military to take the lead in the first place? Their resources have attracted such taskings, yet this is – or should be – a job for diplomats.

‭That said, p‬olicy planning units in foreign ministries have for the most part not been engaged in thinking through the implications.

This is regrettable, because political officers and public diplomacy should have a central role in addressing the drivers of contemporary conflict.

In my recent travels down under, I was struck repeatedly by the sense in which New Zealand and Australia seem for a Canadian at once remote yet accessible, exotic yet familiar.

They are in, but not of the Global South.

I was even more impressed by the extent to which the necessity of adapting to the reality of power shift – notably from the North Atlantic to the Asia Pacific – has registered at both the official level and among the population writ large in both countries.

As Anglophone outliers on the fringe of a former empire, this strategic and historical re-orientation is in many respects understandable, especially given the stunning rise of China and India, the steady progress of integration in Southeast Asia, and the extant economic accomplishments of Japan and Korea. Still, and certainly more so than countries in Europe or the Americas, they are doing what they can to position themselves to advantage.

As I travelled around, field testing the Guerrilla Diplomacy message – namely that the time is ripe for a revolution in diplomatic affairs and the adoption of an alternative understanding of security,‭ ‬development,‭ ‬and international relations in globalization age – the main lines of argument seemed to resonate.

Kiwis and Aussies didn’t need much convincing that if they are going to prosper in the Pacific Century, then they will have to make the most of their diplomatic assets in an increasingly heteropolar world.

For them – as for Canada – hard power coercion is simply not an option. And even if people are not shouting from the rooftops that grand strategy is urgently required, most of those whom I encountered were far less quiescent about their place in the world than your average North American.

Many of those I spoke with even agreed that diplomacy does, or at least should matter.

Nonetheless,‭ in the Antipodes as elsewhere, diplomacy ‬has been marginalized,‭ ‬sidelined,‭ ‬and is in crisis. It is suffering from the same “triple whammy” which has exacted such a devastating toll just about everywhere:‭

• the continuing militarization of international affairs, through which policy has become an instrument of war,‭ ‬rather than reverse, and as a result of which foreign ministries find themselves severely under-resourced

• the substantial failure‭ of diplomatic institutions to ‬adapt their practices to exigencies of globalization, resulting in structures that remain far too risk averse, hierarchic and authoritarian, and largely without the capacity to manage the emerging suite of transnational issues which are rooted in science and driven by technology‭

• the debilitating image, if I may paraphrase the London cabbies whom I focus tested last fall, of diplomacy as synonymous with weakness and appeasement, and diplomats as dithering dandies, hopelessly lost in haze of irrelevance somewhere between protocol and alcohol.‭

Today,‭ then, diplomacy is suffering from grave problems of both image and substance. It is not delivering results for governments or for citizens. To make matters worse, that performance gap is exacerbated by an environment in which the‬ demand for diplomacy vastly outstrips its supply.‭

Evidence of this yawning diplomatic deficit is found not only in the rising tide of suffering,‭ ‬inequality,‭ and ‬unaddressed threats which beset us, but also in the ongoing socialization of globalization’s costs and‭ ‬the privatization of its benefits. The resulting polarization, coupled with the abject failure of diplomacy to engage remedially, in my view constitutes a peril far greater than ‭than any kind of terrorism, political extremism or religious violence.

So. If you don’t want to live in some variation of a of surveillance driven, razor wire encrusted green zone, with security provided by Blackwater and sanitation by KBR, what to do? How to break from this vicious cycle, to get from the unenviable place where we are to somewhere better?

Voyages down under have brought me back to first principles.

In the first instance, the art of international political communication through dialogue, negotiation and compromise needs a new,‭ more ‬contemporary narrative which goes well beyond the current discourse on either traditional or public diplomacy.

There are signs that this project is underway.

Secondly, analysts require a whirled view, a model of global order which extends well beyond the obsolete and territorially distinct notions of first, second and third worlds.

This, too, may be in train.

Finally, a radical and comprehensive reconstruction of mainstream thinking about the essential nature of international relations is long overdue.

Evidence of that enterprise remains scant.

On this climate change challenged, pandemic disease ridden, chronically resource scarce planet we live on, governments desperately need to find a better way forward, one without the enormous human and financial costs associated with the use of armed force.  I would suggest that they start by investing in the creation of a cadre of diplomatic professionals adept at knowledge-based problem solving, and able to apply complex balancing skills among and between sharply competing values, policies and interests.

Defence departments have the money, but this isn’t a job for soldiers.

And aspiring international policy bureaucrats –  those who now dominate diplomatic services and who favour life “in the bubble” to that in the street and prefer chatting with colleagues about what might be going on outside to finding out for themselves – need not apply.

It is time to hold on dispatching the legionnaires and instead to invest in the development of guerrilla diplomacy

Yesterday evening evening I was in Gore, a smallish town of about 10,000 way down near the bottom of the South Island of New Zealand, about one third of the way between Invercargill and Dunedin.

The motor camp in which I stayed did not yet have internet service – most now do – but along the main street I had my choice of Thai, Indian or Vietnamese food.

I was also able to do an interview with radio New Zealand via an excellent connection using my cell phone. Along with the expanded choice of dining options, that’s a  big change since I lived in NZ in 1993-4.

Gore styles itself the brown trout fishing capital of the world, which it may well be, judging by the number of people I saw standing around in the Mataura River in hip waders, smiling and flipping flies into the glistening eddies and beckoning pools.

In the centre of town is a giant sculpture of a jumping brown trout.

That’s a place brand, and it helps to differentiate Gore from other towns, most all of which in New Zealand welcome visitors with some kind of slogan , such as Where the Forest Meets the Sea, or Dairying Capital of the West.

Branding a nation – which consists of a country and its people – is somewhat more complex and difficult.  That kind of brand is formed over time, and comes less from what you say than from how you act and what you do.

When pronouncements and behaviour do not align,  the perilous say-do gap opens like a yawning chasm.

Even the best communications content and practices can never compensate for fundamentally flawed policy. That, among others, was the legacy lesson of the Bush administration.

NZ has made some progress promoting its “clean and green” image, an endeavour which received a major boost through the world-wide attention lavished on the local settings chosen for Peter Jackson’s visually spectacular and wildly popular Lord of the Rings trilogy.

Some of the film locales have become tourist attractions in their own right.

This is a stunning land.  Nature and beautiful scenery, however, are only good to a point – mountains and forests tend to be somewhat widespread and generic.

A successful brand, on the other hand, is unique, conveying both emotional appeal and a value proposition. That’s where the connection to a concrete, and usually highly stylized visual image can play a key role.

When it comes to a  logo, however, not all Kiwis gravitate towards the  silver fern logo which is especially present in some government publications and sports paraphenalia, such as the All Blacks rugby jerseys. Throughout this visit I have been making a point of asking New Zealanders to identify the graphic that best captures their national image, and almost as many have answered the kiwi, the koru, or the flag as have volunteered the silver fern.

That ambiguity is not really a problen at the moment, but if  New Zealand decides to gets serious one day about consolidating its brand internationally, a clear focus on a single  logo will be important.

In my veiw, there  would be much to be gained by pursuing such a course, particularly if the government of NZ choses to niche market itself as the strategic bridge among and between key players on all sides of the Pacific. Power is shifting towards Asia-Pacific as the dynamic centre of the world political economy in the 21st century, and there is no time to lose in this era of heteropolarity. Complex balancing skills, and knowledge driven problem-solving will be the order of the day.

For better or for worse, and as I elaborate at some length in Guerrilla Diplomacy, most countries do have a brand of one kind or another. It may be weak or strong, good or bad, but it’s there.

Consider, for example, this joke, using some familiar European archtypes.

Heaven is a place where the cooks are French, the lovers are Italian, the engineers are German, the time keepers are Swiss and the police are British.

Hell is a place where the lovers are Swiss, the cooks are British, the timekeepers are Italian, the police are German, and the French engineers are on strike…

Sure, these are caricatures, but there is something very elemental and important associated with a country’s image and reputation, which is why many governments have concluded that the matter of their national brand requires active management and consistent attention.

For smaller and medium sized countries, such as Canada or New Zealand, a global branding strategy would play to the advantages of being generally well-regarded internationally, while helping to overcome capacity limitations and the absence of hard power options. If your posture is not threatening, if you carry little historical baggage, if you are not seeking to dominion over others, and if your name evokes a positive pre-disposition, a smile rather than a scowl, then in branding terms you are positioned to advantage.

For all sorts of reasons, to draw again on some European examples, places like Serbia, Latvia and Romania face major branding challenges. On the other hand, countries such as Spain and Ireland, recent economic problems notwithstanding, have done a very good job of turning around their international image and reputation.

Public diplomacy is fuelled by soft power. Foreign ministries in Canada and NZ have ample ability to deliver the former, and each country has substantial reserves of the latter.

It is perhaps time for the world to see more of the silver fern and, might I add,  the maple leaf…

After a pause to regroup and to deliver a graduate seminar on Science, Technology and International Policy at the University of Toronto’s Munk Centre for International Studies, the GD road show is rolling on.

First stop is the Land of the Long White Cloud, or Aotearoa, where I arrived 01 March.

For those who have not had the privilege of visiting New Zealand, this is a compact country of about four and a half million with amazing geographical diversity – a kind of palm at the end of the mind, if I may borrow from the title of an anthology of Wallace Stevens’ poetry. It is one of my favourite spots anywhere, a most extraordinary crucible of human enterprise and experience where, among many other achievements, they have done a better job than most in balancing the needs and interests of first peoples and later arrivals.

To offer a symbolic example of these continuing efforts, when you call the foreign ministry, you are greeted with the Maori kia ora, and MFAT business cards are written in English and Maori.

Some might consider this token. Yet while certainly not without problems, the aboriginal dimension of life here is generally more present, visible and culturally integrated than, for example, in Canada.

For the last few days I have been in Napier, a dream-like, exquisitely human-scale city situated on the shores of Hawkes Bay. It was almost completely destroyed by an earthquake in 1931, and then rebuilt, largely in remarkably harmonious Art Deco style.

Today it stands as compelling testement to the virtues of architectural harmony, an impeccably preserved living monument which makes for a visual feast.

I once served in New Zealand, in 1993-94 as the Canadian Exchange Officer working for the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The exchange position was cut during Canada’s deficit-reducing Program Review exercise later in the nineties. Both countries have lost out on strategic opportunities for collaboration, and in my view have emerged diminished as a result of that myopic decision.

New Zealand is to Australia not unlike what Canada is to the USA – more modest and self-effacing; less assertive, back-slapping and boisterous. Canada and New Zealand have much in common in terms of history and culture. They could, and I think should be doing more together as naturally compatible diplomatic partners, especially in the Asia-Pacific.

For smaller or medium sized countries that enjoy the benefit of a positive international image and reputation and do not threaten anyone or carry the baggage of major powers, the public diplomacy approach to forging joint venture partnerships with the like-minded  should be second nature.

The fact that it is not speaks to the larger, and more universal problem of diplomatic dysfunction.

But back to the here and now… Last Tuesday in Wellington, I had an excellent exchange with a group of MFAT Directors, and met later with their new, and impressive CEO John Allen. He has read GD and is enthusiastic about its contents. As I have noted in my encounters with foreign ministry staff elsewhere, recognition of the need for radical reform in the way we conduct the business of governments at home and abroad appears to be near universal.

Preaching to the converted in foreign ministries is one thing; making the case for diplomacy as a cost-effective alternative to the use of armed force can be quite another.  So far, however, the response of those who have attended my presentations at NZIIA branches in Wellington, Palmerston North, Havelock North and Napier has been both engaged and supportive. Most agree that although the case can be made that diplomacy matters, as a non-violent formula for the management of international relations, it is seriously underperforming.

Why? Because diplomacy has not adapted well to the challenges of globalization, has been sidelined by the continuing militarization of international policy, and as a result suffers from grave problems of both image and substance.

That diagnosis resonates here.

But so do the arguments in favour engineering a more relevant foreign ministry, a transformed foreign service, and a more effective approach to the conduct of diplomatic business.

More on all of this in the coming weeks.